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Inter-national Justice for Them
or Global Justice for Us?: THE
U.S. AS A SUPRANATIONAL JUSTICE
DONOR
*

Margaret M. deGuzman**
U.S. policy concerning international justice, particularly at
the ICC, involves case-by-case support when such support is in
U.S. national interests. This policy signals that the U.S.
considers itself a supranational justice donor rather than a
member of a global justice community committed to enforcing
shared values. This approach to international criminal justice
both inhibits global justice efforts and undermines the U.S. claim
to global moral leadership. The next U.S. administration should
assert full membership in the global justice community by
joining the ICC and providing unequivocal support for all efforts
to address serious international crimes.
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I. Introduction
In one of his relatively few statements about the International
Criminal Court (ICC), President Obama said: “[W]e are engaging
with State Parties to the Rome Statute on issues of concern and are
supporting the ICC’s prosecution of those cases that advance U.S.
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interests and values, consistent with the requirements of U.S. law.”1
This statement reflects the U.S.’s “case-by-case” approach to
supporting international justice efforts.2 Under this policy, the
administration’s support for international justice depends on a
situation-specific assessment of U.S. national interests. As then
Secretary of State Hilary Clinton put it, the U.S. will “look for
opportunities to encourage effective ICC action in ways that promote
U.S. interests by bringing war criminals to justice.”3 This focus on
national interests stands in contrast to the approach to supranational
criminal justice taken in some other parts of the world. For instance,
the European Union emphasizes the importance of promoting
“universality” in relation to the ICC.4 Former UN Secretary General
Kofi Annan also highlights the global nature of the enterprise, urging
all states to “demand that those who claim the mantle of global
leadership accept the duty of promoting global values.”5
The contrast between U.S. policy and rhetoric concerning
supranational justice and those in other parts of the world reflects a
fundamental open question about the nature of the international
criminal justice enterprise. That is, it remains unclear whether the
supranational criminal law regime is intended largely to provide a
framework for states to assist one another in effectuating national
justice goals, an “inter-national” justice agenda, or is instead meant
primarily to reflect and promote global justice norms, a “global”
justice agenda.

1.

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, WHITE HOUSE, 48 (May 2010),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_se
curity_strategy.pdf [http://perma.cc/2BEC-LRLY].

2.

See Caitlin Lambert, The Evolving US Policy Towards the ICC, INT’L
JUST. PROJECT (Mar. 6, 2014), available at
http://www.internationaljusticeproject.com/the-evolving-us-policytowards-the-icc/ [http://perma.cc/FE5M-ALS7].

3.

Walter Pincus, Clinton’s Goals Detailed, WASH. POST (Jan. 19, 2009),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/01/18/AR2009011802268.html
[http://perma.cc/BSA4-ZWZM].

4.

EU efforts to combat impunity, EUR. UNION EXTERNAL ACTION,
http://eeas.europa.eu/human_rights/icc/index_en.htm
[http://perma.cc/C8SU-QELT] (last visited Sept. 11, 2015) (noting “the
EU’s ongoing engagement towards the universality of the Rome Statute
and promoting a better understanding of the ICC’s mandate.”).

5.

Kofi Annan, Address at the First Review Conference of the Assembly of
States Parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC, Kampala, Uganda (May
31, 2010) (emphasis added) (transcript available at
http://kofiannanfoundation.org/newsroom/speeches/2010/05/kofiannan-addresses-first-review-conference-assembly-states-parties-to
assembly-states-parties-to [http://perma.cc/9XHS-3JNU]).
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This essay argues that the U.S. has chosen a policy that promotes
a selective “inter-national” justice for others, rather than one that
signals U.S. membership in a global community committed to global
justice norms. For the U.S. to support supranational justice only in
cases that align with U.S. national interests may make sense if the
regime’s primary goal is inter-national justice assistance. If outside
support is designed to help ensure that justice is done in the state
most affected by the crimes at issue, there are good reasons to make
the investment only when foreign justice advances—or at least does
not detract from—the interests of the assisting state. On the other
hand, if the central purpose of supranational justice is to promote the
norms of a global community, members of the community should
provide their support whenever possible; that is, whenever the costs of
support are not too great in relation to the supporting state’s other
obligations.
The U.S.’s selective case-by-case approach to supranational justice
signals that the U.S. views itself as a supranational justice “donor”
rather than as a leading member of the global justice community.
Although current U.S. policy certainly suggests greater affinity
toward the global justice community than did that of the Bush
Administration, particularly in the latter’s early years, the U.S. has
not claimed full membership in the community. This approach has
consequences for the U.S.’s reputation as a global leader and for the
effectiveness of the supranational justice regime. Remaining outside
the global justice community undermines the U.S.’s ability to act as a
global leader in matters affecting the shared moral norms of the
global community. U.S. exceptionalism in this regard also undermines
the legitimacy of the ICC and of other global justice actors. Not only
is the U.S. withholding its full support from such actors, its case-bycase policy undermines the very notion that a global justice
community exists. If institutions such as the ICC cannot claim to act
on behalf of a global community, their legitimacy becomes precarious,
particularly when their actions affect states that have not consented
to their authority.

II. Case-by-Case Justice
The Obama Administration’s rhetoric is not devoid of references
to global justice values. For instance, President Obama stated that,
“those who intentionally target innocent civilians must be held
accountable.”6 This statement can be read as an implicit
acknowledgement of a global norm requiring accountability for the
war crime of targeting civilians. The U.S. President has also hinted
that accountability for serious international crimes is generally in U.S.
6.

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 1, at 48.
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interests. For example, as a presidential candidate he stated that, “it
is in America’s interests that these most heinous of criminals, like the
perpetrators of the genocide in Darfur, are held accountable.”7
Nonetheless, the Administration’s policy is to support
supranational accountability efforts only in cases that align with U.S.
national interests. In particular, the Administration seems to regard
accountability in Africa as aligning with U.S. interests. The U.S.
provided U.S. military personnel to assist in the capture of notorious
war criminal, Joseph Kony, who is wanted by the ICC,8 and adopted
legislation supporting prosecutions of crimes of sexual violence in the
Democratic Republic of Congo.9 President Obama called for Kenyan
support of ICC prosecutions in that country,10 and the U.S. facilitated
the transfer to the ICC of Bosco Ntaganda, a warlord wanted for
crimes committed in the DRC.11
In contrast, the U.S. has not provided public support to the ICC’s
efforts to encourage national justice in Colombia. Likewise, the U.S.
has resisted Palestinian efforts to involve the ICC in that situation.12
Despite earlier official statements supporting states’ decisions to join
7.

Statements of Barack Obama on the International Criminal Court:
October 6, 2007 responses to candidate questionnaire, AMICC.ORG (Apr.
18, 2011), http://www.amicc.org/docs/Obama%20on%20ICC.pdf
[http://perma.cc/ZU5T-5QWJ].

8.

Lord’s Resistance Army and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009,
Pub. L. No. 111-172,124 Stat. 1209 (2010); Helene Cooper, More U.S.
Troops to Aid Uganda Search for Kony, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/24/world/africa/obama-is-sendingmore-resources-for-joseph-kony-search.html?_r=0 [perma.cc/ERN66XSL]; see also Douglas Dunbar, The Obama Administration’s Evolving
Policy Towards the International Criminal Court, AMICC.ORG (June 29,
2011), http://www.amicc.org/docs/ObamaPolicy.pdf
[http://perma.cc/FQ6X-S7J5].

9.

Dunbar, supra note 8.

10.

President Obama, Statement on the International Criminal Court
Announcement (Dec. 15, 2010) (transcript available at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/12/15/statementpresident-obama-international-criminal-court-announcement
[http://perma.cc/9X5M-9XFD]) (“. . . I urge all of Kenya’s leaders, and
the people whom they serve, to cooperate fully with the ICC
investigation and remain focused on implementation of the reform
agenda and the future of your nation.”).

11.

Suspected War Criminal Surrenders in Rwanda, CNN (Mar. 18, 2013),
http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/18/world/africa/congo-war-crimes/
[http://perma.cc/K2G8-7S7K].

12.

Andrew Novak, Why Palestine Has No Chance at the International
Criminal Court, DAILY BEAST (Apr. 17, 2015),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/04/17/why-palestine-hasno-chance-at-the-international-criminal-court.html
[http://perma.cc/97SS-GCBD].

180

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 48 (2016)
Inter-National Justice for Them or Global Justice for Us?

the ICC,13 the U.S. condemned the decision of Palestine’s President
Mahmoud Abbas to sign the Rome Statute, calling it “counter
productive”14 and asserting that it does “nothing to further the
aspirations of the Palestinian people for a sovereign and independent
state.”15 Indeed, the U.S. has gone so far as to threaten to withhold
funding from Palestine if Palestine pursues ICC action.16 As Professor
John Cerone notes, “[t]he US has tended to support international
criminal courts where the US government has (or is perceived by US
officials to have) a significant degree of control over the court, or
where the prosecution of US nationals is either expressly precluded or
otherwise remote.”17 This case-by-case policy signals that the U.S. is
not always interested in accountability for international crimes.
Of course, the most notable example of the U.S. withholding
support from supranational justice efforts is its failure to become a
party to the ICC. Indeed, the case-by-case policy effectively precludes
U.S. membership in the ICC, since membership would require
unconditional support of the Court’s work. The U.S. justifies
remaining outside the ICC regime, which has now attracted 123
member states, on the grounds that the U.S. is the world’s largest
provider of military assistance around that world, and that ICC
membership would unduly expose U.S. personnel to ICC jurisdiction.18
This argument is further evidence of the U.S. government’s failure to
13.

Dunbar, supra note 8.

14.

Dunbar, supra note 8.

15.

Ruth Eglash & Carol Morello, Palestinian Leader Mahmoud Abbas
Moves to Join International Criminal Court, WASH. POST (Dec. 31,
2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/israel-thanks-us-forabstaining-on-security-council-resolution/2014/12/31/9b84cfa8-90d211e4-a412-4b735edc7175_story.html [http://perma.cc/D99V-5JP6].

16.

Diaa Hadid & Somini Sengupta, Palestinians to Seek War Crimes
Charges Against Israel at Hague Court, N. Y. TIMES (Jun. 24 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/25/world/middleeast/palestinians-toaccuse-israel-of-war-crimes-in-international-court.html?_r=0
[http://perma.cc/KMN3-H6SW] (noting that the United States
“provides the Palestinian Authority with about $400 million annually”);
Benny Tsododo, US Threatening Global Justice, HERALD (Jan. 26,
2015), http://www.herald.co.zw/us-threatening-global-justice/
threatening-global-justice/ [http://perma.cc/7VG2-FG4K] (noting the
United States’ plan to withhold this funding); see Mark Kersten, The
US and the ICC: Towards a Closer Relationship?, JUST. IN CONFLICT
(Apr. 10, 2011), available at http://justiceinconflict.org/2011/04/10/theus-and-the-icc-towards-a-closer-relationship/ [http://perma.cc/K5HFJNHJ] (providing examples of selective US involvement).

17.

John P. Cerone, Dynamic Equilibrium: The Evolution of US Attitudes
toward International Criminal Courts and Tribunals, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L.
277, 315 (2007).

18.

President Barack Obama, supra note 10.
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endorse global community values. If the U.S. shares the values of the
global community in matters of supranational criminal justice, it
should implement those values in our national system. It should also
be open to the possibility that a failure to implement global values
nationally will be remedied through ICC action.
In sum, by supporting international criminal justice only when
such justice aligns with U.S. national interests, and never for crimes
committed by U.S. nationals, the U.S. has positioned itself as an
international justice donor rather than a member of the global justice
community. The next section examines how this approach fits into
current understandings of the role of supranational criminal law
institutions.

III. Inter-national or Global Justice?
One way to understand the work of international criminal courts,
in particular the ICC, is as a vehicle for promoting national justice in
the states most affected by the crimes at issue. Accordingly,
international courts serve as back-ups for unavailable or inadequate
national justice systems and should seek to address the justice needs
of national communities.19 Alternatively, international criminal courts
can be viewed primarily as vehicles for global criminal justice. This
option assumes the existence of a global community with values
shared by a large portion of the world. The enforcement of these
global values has merit independent of the needs or desires of the
communities most affected by the crimes.
These two depictions of the nature of supranational criminal
justice are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, the Rome Statute of the
ICC reflects an intention to promote both national and global justice.
The Statute’s preamble suggests that the Court aims to “put an end
to impunity” for “crimes [that] threaten the peace, security and wellbeing of the world,” while various other provisions indicate that the
Court seeks to address the needs of victims of particular crimes.20
19.

Scholars of transitional justice often advance this view. See e.g., Jaya
Ramji-Nogales, Designing Bespoke Transitional Justice: A Pluralist
Process Approach 32 MICH J. INT’L L. 1, 24 (2010) (arguing that
‘internationalized criminal courts . . . have not fared well in the eyes of
local populations. The ad hoc tribunals’ failure to incorporate local
preferences into their design process led to widespread rejection of these
courts by members of the affected societies.’). See also Jaya RamjiNogales, Bespoke Transitional Justice at the International Criminal
Court, in CONTESTED JUSTICE: THE POLITICS AND PRACTICE OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT INTERVENTIONS, 106-21 (Christian
DeVos et al. eds., 2015).

20.

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, pmbl., arts. 15
(3)(a), 43(6), 54(3)(b), 68(3), 75(3), 82(4), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9
(1998).
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Resource limitations, however, require international criminal law
institutions to prioritize one of these objectives much of the time. For
instance, the ICC must choose whether to prosecute a wide range of
crimes and perpetrators to satisfy the greatest possible number of
victims, or to prosecute select crimes that best represent the global
values most in need of expression.21
The rhetoric of state actors articulating policies related to
supranational criminal justice often reflects their views of the
dominant role of the relevant institutions. For instance, in a
statement of support for the ICC, a representative from Norway
stated, “we believe that the ICC, by combating impunity, will provide
the international community long term peace making dividends.”22
Similarly, in recommending ratification of the Rome Statute,
parliamentarians in the Dominican Republic highlighted the role of
the ICC in helping to “consolidate the cause of international
justice.”23
In contrast, the U.S.’s case-by-case support policy suggests that
the U.S. views supranational justice as a backstop for unavailable
national justice systems—a justice aid program. When it is in U.S.
national interests, or at least not contrary to those interests, the U.S.
is willing to provide assistance to ensure that justice is done for mass
crimes committed overseas. As one commentator notes: “[The U.S.]
supports ad hoc international criminal justice by special courts and
tribunals on an ad hoc basis, but is fundamentally opposed to the
cosmopolitan aspirations of a standing court with a global reach.”24 If

21.

See generally Margaret deGuzman, Choosing to Prosecute: Expressive
Selection in the International Criminal Court, 33 MICH. J. INT’L L. 265
(2012) (for a discussion on the selection of cases at the ICC).

22.

EXCERPTS FROM THE 6TH COMMITTEE DISCUSSION OF ITEM 164:
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT/56TH
ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS (Nov. 12, 2001), available at
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/Norway6thComm12Nov01.pdf
[http://perma.cc/9WHC-DRL6].

23.

Nat’l Cong. Dom. Rep., Santo Domingo Plan of Action on the Rule of
Law & the ICC (October 30-31, 2008),
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/SantoDomingoPlanAction31Oct08_
en1.pdf [http://perma.cc/3ZFD-JRDH].

24.

KINGSLEY CHIEDU MOGHALU, GLOBAL JUSTICE: THE POLITICS OF WAR
CRIMES TRIALS 147 (2006), excerpt available at
https://books.google.com/books?id=Pdgg0EDpQ4C&pg=PA180&lpg=PA180&dq=great+britain+global+justice+inter
national+criminal+law&source=bl&ots=7LmRhWokH8&sig=l4YRxUU
_zWLlGDIaM4DHwwwKugc&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CB4Q6AEwAGoVC
hMIm9egns_WxwIVhTwCh3Tngoa#v=snippet&q=%22united%20states%22&f=false
[http://perma.cc/2DEX-JBM9]; see also David Forsythe, The United
States and International Criminal Justice, 24 HUM. RTS. Q. 974,
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the U.S. considered itself part of a global justice community, it would
view all violations of that community’s values as threats to the
wellbeing of the community. It would therefore treat all efforts to
remedy such violations as being in the national interest.
If supranational justice is most appropriately understood as a
form of international assistance to national justice systems, current
U.S. policy does not threaten the viability of the regime. If, on the
other hand, supranational criminal law is an effort to build a global
community and promote its values, the case-by-case policy both
threatens that project and undermines the U.S.’s reputation as a
global leader.25

IV. Consequences of Selective Support for Global
Justice
The U.S.’s case-by-case policy threatens the global justice project
in a number of ways. First, it calls into question the very existence of
a global community of shared criminal justice values. The idea of a
global criminal justice community hinges on a presumption in favor of
accountability for all international crimes. This is not to say that
criminal prosecutions are mandatory in all cases, but that such
prosecution is at least considered to be an important interest of the
global community that should only give way to other interests under
exceptional circumstances. The U.S. position that accountability for
international crimes is only sometimes in its national interest
undermines the cosmopolitan claim of the global justice community.
Second, providing selective support based on U.S. interests,
without subjecting U.S. citizens to the ICC’s jurisdiction, suggests
that international justice is a tool of the powerful against the less
powerful. This is perhaps the most persistent and damaging
accusation facing the ICC.26 The problem of selectivity has particular
974(2004) (arguing that “US exceptionalism and commitment to power
politics” shape the US’ approach to international criminal justice.).
25.

Tsododo, supra note 16 (“By seeking to block Palestinians from
accessing justice and also threatening the existence of the ICC, the US
has proved to be a dimming beacon of democracy that is morphing into
an albatross around the neck of international justice.”).

26.

Moses Kuria, Why Was CJ So Soft on USA And ICC?, STAR (Oct. 13,
2012), http://www.the-star.co.ke:8080/article/why-was-cj-so-soft-usaand-icc [http://perma.cc/8KY9-X7K2]; see David P. Forsythe, ‘Political
Trials’? The UN Security Council and the Development of International
Criminal Law, ASHGATE RES. COMPANION INT’L CRIM. L. 496 (William
Schabas et al. eds., 2013) (“[D]ouble standards obviously persist. China,
Russia and the United States refuse to ratify ICC arrangements that
would legally regulate them, but push the ICC on others. Particularly,
the United States, which has been a major advocate for such measure as
the UN ad hoc courts and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, has sought
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force in fueling claims that the ICC is biased against Africans.27
Indeed, some critics invoke charges of selectivity in urging African
states to withdraw from the ICC.28 According to one commentator:
“[i]ts name notwithstanding, the ICC is rapidly turning into a
Western court to try African crimes against humanity. It has targeted
governments that are U.S. adversaries and ignored actions the United
States doesn’t oppose . . . effectively conferring impunity on them.”29
to turn American exceptionalism into legal exceptionalism.”); Richard
Goldstone, Is the International Criminal Court an Institution with an
African Agenda?, INT’L JUD. MONITOR (Winter 2012), available at
http://www.judicialmonitor.org/archive_winter2012/globaljudicialpersp
ective.html [http://perma.cc/PE2Y-NLKT] (“It is not in the interests of
international justice that the ICC should have jurisdiction over the
nationals of the small and weak nations but not those of the large and
powerful”).
27.

Nick Mangwana, AU- Contradictions and Duplicity of the West,
HERALD (Feb. 3, 2015), http://www.herald.co.zw/au-contradictions-andduplicity-of-the-west/ [http://perma.cc/FK8X-6FMH]; Duncan Miriri,
Uganda’s Musevini Calls on African Nations to Quit the ICC, REUTERS
WORLD NEWS (Dec. 12, 2014),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/12/us-africa-iccidUSKBN0JQ1DO20141212 [http://perma.cc/D2TU-EVD4]; see also
Zaya Yeebo, Pan African perspectives on the ICC, African elections,
and Western ire, PAMBAZUKA NEWS (Aug. 6, 2014),
http://www.pambazuka.net/en/category.php/comment/92741
[http://perma.cc/7QUJ-GCCX] (referring to the ICC as an example of
imperialism and Western domination as well as stating “[the ICC] has
been hijacked by the west, and as a result, is nothing less than a
neocolonial instrument of manipulation… To put it mildly, the ICC as
currently constituted, is the stick for African leaders who refuse to
become willing tools”).

28.

Dr. David Hoile, Why Africa May Leave the ICC, NEW TIMES (July 28,
2015), http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/article/2015-07-28/191046/
[http://perma.cc/HQ84-8Z4K] (“Broader Western hypocrisy is all too
evident. The United States has forcefully pointed out that the ICC is a
kangaroo court, a travesty of justice open to political influence and that
no American citizen will ever come before it.”); Miriri, supra note 27;
Peter Kagwanja, How ICC and Security Influenced Foreign Policy,
DAILY NATION (Dec. 31, 2014), http://mobile.nation.co.ke/blogs/ICCCases-Kenya-Uhuru-Kenyatta-William-Ruto/-/1949942/2574922//format/xhtml/-/m7w7uf/-/index.html [http://perma.cc/FK8X-6FMH]
(noting Museveni “criticised the ICC for continuing with Ruto’s case
despite an African Union (AU) resolution that no sitting African Head
of State or deputy should be tried at the court. ‘I will bring a motion to
the African Union’s next session... I want all of us to get out of that
court of the West’”); Mangwana, supra note 27 (noting that Zimbabwe
President Mugabe put “pulling out of the ICC on the agenda of the
June 2015 Summit”).

29.

Kirsten Ainley, The Responsibility to Protect and the International
Criminal Court: counteracting the crisis, 91:1 INT’L AFF. 37, 42 (2015),
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_pub
lication_docs/INTA91_1_03_Ainley.pdf [http://perma.cc/7P56-7Q73];
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The ICC is thus charged with being “a neo-imperial project set up to
try the enemies of the United States, or the inhabitants of Africa.”30
Accusations of Western manipulation lead some commentators to
conclude “that the ICC is an inept, corrupt, political court.”31
More generally, commentators assert that by withholding its full
support from the ICC, the U.S. undermines the Court’s legitimacy.
As one author writes:
Without US participation, the ICC will not only lack the
support of the most powerful nation on the planet, it will lack
the legitimacy in international politics that the United States
could grant with its predominant role in the international arena,
and a history of being the most vocal proponent for human
rights within the last century.32

At a practical level, the absence of U.S. support in enforcing ICC
arrest warrants undermines the Court’s effectiveness.33 A notable
example is the failure to arrest Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir
who is the subject of an ICC indictment.34
The case-by-case policy also undermines the U.S.’s reputation as a
global leader. Since members of the global justice community view
membership as a moral imperative, they are less likely to trust and

see Kersten, supra note 16 (“Where the ICC is useful to the US’s
political aims, it is used. When it becomes an obstacle or exhausts its
utility, the US administration has not hesitated to not only reduce its
engagement but undermine the mandate of the court”).
30.

Ainley, supra note 29, at 50 (internal footnotes omitted); Henry J.
Richardson, African Grievances and the International Criminal Court,
AFR. & FUTURE INT’L CRIM. JUST. 81, 109 (Vincent O. Nmehielle ed.,
2013).

31.

Hoile, supra note 28; see also David Chuter, The ICC: A Place for
Africans or Africans in their Place?, AFR. & FUTURE INT’L CRIM. JUST.
161, 179 (Vincent O. Nmehielle ed., 2012) (“The result of high-level
politics of international criminal justice…is that it is likely that the only
real action the ICC is likely to be able to undertake will be against
small, poor, friendless states, especially in Africa.”).

32.

Megan E. Lantto, The United States and the International Criminal
Court: A Permanent Divide?, 31 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 619, 638
(2008).

33.

See Jonathan Bracewell, Will it Float? The ICC Without the United
States, 6 REGENT J. INT’L L. 483, 506-07 (2008) (discussing the obstacles
and requirements for ICC enforcement power).

34.

See e.g., Norimitsu Onishi, Bid by Omar al-Bashir of Sudan to Avoid
Arrest Is Tested in South Africa, N. Y. TIMES (June 14, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/15/world/africa/bashir-sudaninternational-criminal-court-south-africa.html [http://perma.cc/4ZUXVW8Q].
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respect states, like the U.S., that remain outside the community.35 If
the U.S. does not unequivocally support an institution aimed at
ending impunity for crimes that “threaten the peace, security and
well-being of the world,” how can it be trusted to lead the world in
other areas of moral importance, such as respect for human rights?

V. Is a Global Justice Policy Possible in the U.S.?
Supporters of a global justice agenda sometimes suggest that
although the case-by-case policy may not be ideal, it is the best the
U.S. can do in light of current national political realities.36 This may
be true. Moreover, it is also true that the Obama Administration’s
selective support for the ICC is far better than the prior
Administration’s early active opposition to the Court.37
Nonetheless, there is some reason to believe that a global justice
policy is possible for the U.S. In particular, surveys of Americans
consistently show a high level of support for joining the ICC.38
Admittedly, as one organization supportive of the ICC states: while
“instinctive support for the Court is broad-based,” such support
remains “shallow and untapped.”39 Most Americans support the
general idea of an ICC but are fairly uninformed about the nature of
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the ICC and the current level of U.S. involvement.40 According to a
December 2014 study, 64% of Americans know nothing about the
ICC, as opposed to 15% who know a “great deal or fair amount;” and
59% do not know whether or not the U.S. is a member.41 Of the
slightly informed, 63% believe the U.S. is a member of the Court.42
Nonetheless, the majority of those surveyed who are even slightly
knowledgeable about the ICC support increased U.S. involvement.43
Moreover, those who are highly knowledgeable about the ICC are
often very supportive of the institution.44
This generally high level of support for the ICC—an institution
with global reach and mandatory jurisdiction—suggests that many
Americans would support a policy more consistent with global justice
values. It may, therefore, be time to challenge the assumption that
insufficient domestic support exists for joining the ICC, and the global
justice community more broadly.

VI. Conclusion
With a new U.S. Administration coming into office next year, the
time is ripe to reconsider U.S. policy toward the ICC and other
international criminal justice institutions. The U.S. should signal full
membership in the global justice community by joining the ICC and
providing unequivocal support for all efforts to address serious
international crimes.

40.

Id.

41.

Americans Continue to Support Involvement with the International
Criminal Court (ICC), IPSOS (Dec. 16, 2014), available at
http://www.ipsos-na.com/news-polls/pressrelease.aspx?id=6697
[http://perma.cc/9PUA-BAJ2].

42.

Id.

43.

Id.

44.

See e.g., Resolution adopted by the Assembly of the Minnesota State Bar
Association, Minneapolis, Minnesota, AMICC.ORG (Sept. 17, 2010),
http://www.amicc.org/docs/MSBA09172010.pdf
[http://perma.cc/22RM-SYRG] (urging the United States “to take steps
towards ratification of the Rome Statute by expanding and broadening
United States interaction with the International Criminal Court,
including cooperation with the Court’s investigations and
proceedings.”); see also CAICC, supra note 38 (“Recent polls indicate
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allow Chicago individuals and organizations to make it clear to our
elected officials that our government’s present obstruction of the Court
is inconsistent with our core values, and that our appreciation for
freedom and the protection of human rights demand that the U.S. ratify
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